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Second price allpay auctions (wars of attritions) have an evolu-
tionarily stable equilibrium in pure strategies if valuations are private
information. I show that for any level of uncertainty there exists a
pure deviation strategy close to the equilibrium strategy such that
for some valuations the equilibrium strategy has a selective disadvan-
tage against the deviation if the population mainly plays the deviation
strategy. There is no deviation strategy with this destabilizing prop-
erty for all valuations if the distribution of valuations has a monotonic
hazard rate. I argue that in the Bayesian game studied here, a mass
deviation can be caused by the entry of a small group of agents. Nu-
meric calculations indicate that the closer the deviation strategy to
the equilibrium strategy, the less valuations are destabilizing. I show
that the equilibrium strategy does not satisfy continuous stability.
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1Extended Abstract
This paper analyzes the stability of equilibrium behavior in second price all-
pay auctions of incomplete information. An allpay auction is a contest in
which each contestant exerts eﬀorts that are foregone regardless of winning
the prize. In a second price allpay auction, the winner pays the second highest
bid and all other contestants pay their own bid. This contest is also known
as the ’War of Attrition’. Beside the biological interpretation, electoral ﬁrst-
pass-the-post campaigns, lobbying, academic research, public invitations to
tender, and irreducible investments with conditional stochastic yields are
all examples in which monetary or non-monetary spendings are sunk before
the ﬁnal allocation of the prize is ﬁxed. A strategy is a mapping from a
continuum of valuations into the non-negative reals. For such strategies the
literature does not agree on the notion of stability. If the valuations are equal
and ﬁxed for each participant, the unique equilibrium has full support and
satisﬁes all stability conditions deﬁned for games with continuous strategies
such as neighborhood invader strategy, continuously stable strategy, and in
particular the strongest: evolutionary robustness. This is in line with May-
nard Smith’s (1974) ﬁnding that the equilibrium is evolutionarily stable, a
stability concept deﬁned for games with ﬁnitely many strategies. In the game
in which valuations are only privately known, I prove the existence of a strat-
egy which is destabilizing for an open set of valuations for any continuous
distribution of valuations. This contrasts the ﬁnding by Bishop, Cannings
and Maynard Smith (1978) that the equilibrium is evolutionarily stable. A
biological interpretation of private valuations is the intensity of hunger which
cannot be observed directly by the contestant, economic interpretations re-
fer to non-monetary private preferences for the resource or unobservable cost
intensities for eﬀort exertion. I show that there is no strategy with such a
destabilizing property for all valuations. The stability concepts deﬁned for
games with continuous strategy sets require stability against mass deviations,
that is if the whole population simultaneously and identically deviates. While
in games of complete information such a deviation is of least plausibility, in
the war of attrition with incomplete information a mass deviation can be
triggered by a mutation of an arbitrary small fraction of the population that
changes its valuations. This mutation changes the distribution of valuations
within the population and hereby the equilibrium strategy. The inititial mu-
tation of the small fraction is as if the whole population simultaneously and
identically deviates to a non-equilibrium strategy.
21 Introduction & Literature
In this paper I analyze the stability of equilibrium behavior in second price
allpay auctions of incomplete information with two contestants. An allpay
auction is a contest in which each contestant exerts eﬀorts that are foregone
regardless of winning the prize. In a second price allpay auction, the win-
ner pays the second highest bid and all other contestants pay their own bid.
This contest is also known as the ’War of Attrition’ which was introduced
by Maynard Smith (1974). Beside the biological interpretation, an allpay
auction is a situation to which social agents are exposed in daily routine: a
successful job market candidate needs to be better qualiﬁed than the second
best candidate, a sprinter needs to poke his or her nose a fraction of a second
over the ﬁnish line before the second fastest athlete. Electoral ﬁrst-pass-the-
post campaigns, lobbying, academic research, public invations to tender, and
irreducible investments with conditional stochastic yields are all examples in
which monetary or non-monetary spendings are sunk before the ﬁnal alloca-
tion of the prize is ﬁxed. These situations also share the property that the
absolute value of the bid is irrelevant - what matters is relative bid intensities.
I study contests in which the valuation for the prize is private information.
Situations in which the prize is equally valuable for all contestants but the
cost of exerting eﬀorts diﬀer are every bit as plausible as the setting chosen
here and can be seen as equivalent after a transformation of payoﬀs.
Maynard Smith (1974)’s ‘War of Attrition’ and related allpay auctions have
been shown to be the limit of other, more general models as in Abreu & Gul
(2000) who develop a model of reputation based bargaining or Lang et al.
(2010) who analyze stochastic (Poisson) contests and Che & Gale (2000)
who analyze rent seeking games. Bishop, Cannings & Maynard Smith (1978)
characterize the ESS for the case of incomplete information. Milgrom & We-
ber (1985) show that as uncertainty approaches zero, the distribution of the
(pure) bids converges to the mixed strategy distribution of Maynard Smith
(1974). The War of Attrition with incomplete information has also been
studied by Nalebuﬀ & Riley (1985) and Ponsati & S´ akovics (1995).
It is understood that the War of Attrition, or other allpay auctions can
be found in many economic applications, such as the IO models ‘The Gen-
eralized War of Attrition’ in Bulow & Klemperer (1999) or Konrad (2006).
3Beside Maynard Smith (1974), allpay auctions with complete information
have been studied by Tullock (1980), Baye, Kovenock & De Vries (1996),
Siegel (2009), and Moldovanu & Sela (2001, 2006)
Rose (1978) studies the evolutionary stability of allpay ﬁrst price auctions
(Scotch Auctions), the stability of ﬁrst price auctions in which only the win-
ner pays has been studied by Hon-Snir, Monderer & Sela (1998) and Louge &
Riedel (2010). The War of Attrition in ﬁnite populations has been studied by
Riley (1980), allpay auctions (Tullock-contest) have been shown to exhibit
non-Nash behavior for ﬁnite populations by Leininger (2009). Damianov,
Oechssler & Becker (2010) investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory
price auction is better for the seller in an experiment.
Bishop, Cannings & Maynard Smith (1978) use the concept of evolution-
ary stability in a game with continuous strategies. For such games it has
been proposed to use other concepts as neighborhood invader strategy (NIS,
Apaloo (1997, 2006)), continuously stable strategy (CSS, Eshel (1983)), evo-
lutionary robustness (ER, Oechssler & Riedel (2002), and asymmetric CSS
and NIS (Cressman (2010)), because it has been shown that evolutionary
stability is not suﬃcient for dynamic stability if strategies are continuous.
Already Bishop & Cannings (1978) show convergence to the ESS in their
’Generalized War of Attrition’ only for ﬁnite strategy sets. To stress that
the critique of the use of ESS is long known I quote Hofbauer, Schuster &
Sigmund (1979), p.611:
“(...) [I]t could be that under certain circumstances it would be
more appropriate to study asymptotically stable equilibria of (l),
rather than ESS.”
The referred to equation (1) is the replicator dynamic.
The eﬀect of discretization of a continuous game is the subject of Al´ os-Ferrer
(2006). Also Boudreau (2010) studies allpay auctions with discrete action
spaces.
Krishna & Morgan (1997) develop a model in which allpay auctions raise
more expected revenue than other sealed-bid auction forms. Leininger (2000)
sees the allpay auction as a benchmark lottery and discusses the role of
the revenue equivalence theorem in understanding the diﬀerences of auction
4types.
This paper adds to the literature that analyzes the dynamic stability of equi-
librium strategies in auctions. In the current setting, a strategy is a mapping
from a continuum of types (valuations) into the non-negative reals. For such
strategies the literature does not agree on the notion of stability. I prove the
existence of an invader strategy which is destabilizing for an open set of val-
uations for any continuous distribution of valuations. I show that there is no
strategy with such a property for all valuations. I show that the equilibrium
strategy is not continuously stable (Eshel (1983)). I hereby claim that there
is no good argument for dynamic stability of the equilibrium strategy in the
war of attrition with private valuations. Section 2 presents the static model
and its equilibrium, section 3 discusses the use of the stability concept. Sec-
tions 4 and 5 collect the analytic respective the numeric results and section
6 concludes.
2 The Static Model
Let there be two contestants, each having a valuation in the set V ⊂ R+,
where V is an interval containing the valuation ¯ v. The valuations are dis-
tributed according to a cdf F with continuous positive density f. Let B = R+
be the set of bids that a contestant can choose from. A pure bid-strategy is a
mapping β : V → B that assigns for each valuation v ∈ V a bid β(v) ∈ B. If
one contestant uses strategy β, the other contestant with bid b and valuation
v expects to receive payoﬀs
π(b|v,β) =

       
       
 









{w:β(w)>b} bf(w)dw does not get the prize and
pays own bid.




(v + b − β(w))f(w)dw − b .
52.1 Equilibrium
Bishop, Cannings & Maynard Smith (1978) show that the unique Bayesian







If F is the uniform distribution on [0,1], then
β(v) = −ln(1 − v) − v
Figure (2.1) below depicts the contour curves of π(b|v,β) and the equilibrium
strategy β (dashed line) if valuations are uniform on [0,1].
Figure 1: level curves and equilibrium strategy for uniform valuations
If the valuation is ﬁxed at ¯ v, F({w : w = ¯ v}) = 1 Maynard Smith (1974)
shows that the unique symmetric equilibrium1 consists of the mixed strategy
σ(b) = 1
¯ ve−b/¯ v. Maynard Smith (1974) shows that the mixed strategy is an
ESS in the game of complete information and Bishop, Cannings & Maynard
Smith (1978) show evolutionary stability of the pure strategy equilibrium in
the game of incomplete information.
1There is an asymmetric equilibrium (b,d) with b ≥ ¯ v and d = 0.
6Milgrom & Weber (1985) argue that if F is uniformly concentrated on a
neighborhood (¯ v−ǫ, ¯ v+ǫ), then in equilibrium (β,β) the distribution of bids
converges to the distribution induced by σ(b) if ǫ → 0.
3 Dynamic Stability
To analyze dynamic stability, we have the following interpretation of the
model: suppose that there is an inﬁnite population of contestants each having
a ﬁxed valuation such that the distribution of valuations matches F. To
play the contest, two agents are independently and uniformly matched. For
each agent a strategy is an element of B rather than a mapping β : V →
B. A stability condition needs to hold for each single valuation v. Bishop,
Cannings & Maynard Smith (1978) show that the condition for evolutionary
stability does hold for each valuation. As several authors pointed out, the
standard notion of ESS is not suﬃcient for dynamic stability in games of
inﬁnite strategies. For such games CSS, NIS, and ER have been proposed.
Any of these concepts require stability against mass deviations. A mass
deviation describes a situation in which each agent of the population simul-
taneously deviates to an identical strategy. This seems to be a very odd and
implausible event as ‘trembles’ of ‘mutations’ usually are seen as indepen-
dent events. Why can the whole population independently and undirectedly
‘mutate’ to the same deviation strategy? In the Bayesian game considered
here, I show below that there is a correlation device that gives a plausible
interpretation for mass deviations and that this mass deviations is triggered
by an arbitrarily small subgroup of agents.
3.1 discrete vs continuous strategy sets
Consider a game with two pure strategies “0” and “1”. Suppose the current
state is that all agents play “0”. Let us have a brief view on two distinct
deviations:
Deviation A: a small fraction ǫ of agents deviate to the strategy “1”.
Deviation B: all agents deviate to the mixed strategy (1 − ǫ)   “0” + ǫ   “1”.
Let σi
ǫ be the pure strategy played by a randomly chosen agent after the
deviation i ∈ {A,B}. Then Prob(σA
ǫ = “0”) = 1 − ǫ = Prob(σB
ǫ = “0”) and
7Prob(σA
ǫ = “1”) = ǫ = Prob(σB
ǫ = “1”). The type of deviation is irrelevant
for the payoﬀs of an individual.
Consider now the continuous strategy set S = [0,1] with the current state
δ0.2 Deviation A would correspond to the distribution σA
ǫ = (1−ǫ) δ0+ǫ δ1,
a small fraction of agents deviates to strategy 1 and deviation B would be
σB
ǫ = δǫ, the whole population deviates to strategy ǫ close to strategy zero.
How close are σA
ǫ and σB
ǫ to δ0? The answer hereto depends on the used
measure of distance:
For two functions f,g : S → R deﬁne
ǫ
A















Deﬁne di(f,g) = max{ǫi
x : x ∈ S}. Then
dA(δ0,σ
A
ǫ ) = ǫ and dA(δ0,σ
B




ǫ ) = 1 and dB(δ0,σ
B
ǫ ) = ǫ.
Depending on the choice of the measure of distance, one kind of deviation
is close to the equilibrium strategy while the other is not. If the standard
deﬁnition of the ESS is used for continuous strategies, then an ESS is stable
against deviations that are close in the sense of dA. The concepts CSS and
NIS use dB. A strategy is ER if it is stable against deviations that are close
in the sense of either dA or dB, hence min{dA,dB}. The metric for ER uses
ǫx = min
 
ǫ ≥ 0 : f(x) ≤
  x+ǫ
x−ǫ
g(x)dx + ǫ and
  x+ǫ
x−ǫ
f(x)dx + ǫ ≥ g(x)
 
,
d(f,g) = max{ǫx : x ∈ S}
and is a simpliﬁed version of the Prohorov metric for the special case if
S ⊂ R+. Note that dA( ) and dB( ) coincide on ﬁnite strategy sets.
2δx is the dirac measure on strategy x, the pure state in which all agents play x.
83.2 A justiﬁcation for B-deviations
If F is uniform on [0,1], the equilibrium strategy is β(v) = −ln(1 − v) − v
for all v. Imagine that f and F change slightly to
fa(v) =
 
1 − a + 4av if v < 1
2




(1 − a)v + 2av2 if v < 1
2
(1 + 3a)v − a − 2av2 if v ≥ 1
2
for a ∈ (0,1]. If a = 1, then fa is the density of the sum of two variables that
are uniform on [0, 1
2]. The equilibrium strategy changes to
βa(v) =
   v
0
w(1−a+4aw)
1−(1−a)w−2aw2dw if v < 1









1−(1+3a)w+a+2aw2dw if v ≥ 1
2
If a = 1 then
β1(v) =
   v
0
4w2
1−2w2dw if v < 1









1−wdw if v ≥ 1
2
.
A sudden change from fa to f can then be seen as a B-deviation: given f
Figure 2: Equilibrium strategies for distributions F and Fa with a = 1.
the equilibrium strategy is β, but the population still plays the strategy βa.
9More generally, consider a situation in which the valuations are distributed
according to a distribution function G with density g and the population




1−G(w)dw for all v ∈ V. If a
small group of agents with ﬁxed valuations enters the population, then the
distribution of valuations changes slightly from G to F (and g to f). This
invasion by a small group is as if the whole population simultaneously and
identically deviates to strategy γ which is distinct and close to the equilib-




1−F(w)dw for all v ∈ V.
In the sections below I investigate whether the conditions are met such that
agents of any type v change their strategy from γ(v) to β(v) in payoﬀ mono-
tonic dynamics.
3.3 Deﬁnitions
For symmetric games with ﬁnite sets of strategies an evolutionarily stable
strategy is deﬁned as a strategy that cannot be invaded by any similar strat-
egy:
Deﬁnition 1 (ESS) A strategy x is an evolutionarily stable strategy if
π(x,x) ≥ π(y,x) for any strategy y and if
π(x,x) = π(y,x) for some y, then π(x,y) > π(y,y).
The logic behind the deﬁnition is that whenever a homogenous ESS popula-
tion is invaded by a small portion of mutants, the ESS agents have a selective
advantage against the mixture in which the population mainly plays the evo-
lutionarily stable strategy and a small fraction mutates. Still, deﬁnition 1
technically allows for two interpretations of mutations. The ﬁrst, and usually
preferred interpretation is that mutations happen independently and undi-
rected. This means that only a very small fraction of agents mutates and
that the mutant strategy can be any strategy of the set of strategies. The
second interpretation, merely from a correlated shocks perspective, is that
almost all agents change their strategy, but the new strategy must be very
similar to the original one.
Hofbauer, Schuster & Sigmund (1979) show that a strategy is ESS if and
only if it satisﬁes π(x,y) > π(y,y) for all y  = x if the game is ﬁnite. Weibull
(1995) coins this condition
10Deﬁnition 2 (local superiority, Weibull 1995) x is locally superior if it
has a neighborhood U such that π(x,y) > π(y,y) for all y  = x in U.
It is exactly this condition which was used by Hofbauer, Schuster & Sigmund
(1979) to construct a Lyapunov function to show asymptotic stability. It will
reappear in the deﬁnitions of stability that follow.
The following deﬁnition for neighborhood invader strategy says that if the
population mainly uses a strategy y that is distinct to the neighborhood
invader strategy x, x has a selective advantage over y.
Deﬁnition 3 (NIS, Apaloo 2006) A strategy x is a neighborhood invader
strategy if for any y: π(x,y) ≥ π(y,y) and if π(x,y) = π(y,y) then π(x,x) >
π(y,x).
Strategy x is a local NIS (Apaloo 1997), if the deﬁnition above holds for all
y close to x. If NIS x is considered to be robust against mutations, the inter-
pretation of stability for this concept is that the population mainly mutates
to a strategy y which is close but selection still favors x.
Eshel (1983) also considers deviations of type B given some ESS x when
asking
“If a large enough majority of the population prefers a strategy
y which is suﬃciently close to x (...), will it be advantageous for
each individual in this population to choose a strategy closer to,
rather than further apart from x?”
Deﬁnition 4 (CSS, Eshel 1983) An ESS x is continuously stable if there
is a value ǫ > 0 such that for any strategy y ǫ−close to x there is some δ > 0
such that for any strategy u at a δ-distance to y it holds that π(u,y) > π(y,y)
if and only if |u − x| < |y − x|.
Eshel (1983) also oﬀers a necessary and a suﬃcient condition for continuous
stability which involve the second derivative of the payoﬀ function with re-
spect to the strategy of the opponent. In the game studied here, the strategy
of the opponent is the population strategy which is a function mapping val-
uations to bids and the necessary and suﬃcient conditions cannot be applied.
The next deﬁnition is perhaps the strongest notion of dynamic stability in
11non-cooperative games as it it requires robustness against the largest set of
deviations.
Deﬁnition 5 (ER, Oechssler & Riedel 2002) A strategy x is ER if π(x,y) >
π(y,y) for all y  = x that are ǫ-close to x in the Prohorov metric.
The deﬁnition is originally stated for mixed strategies, for the purpose of
this paper it suﬃces to give the deﬁntion for pure strategies. Note that NIS
 ⇔ ER but that the local version of NIS is necessary for ER.
In the next section I argue that for some valuations the equilibrium strategy
β neither is a locally superior or locally NIS nor CSS and hereby that the
conditions for ER are not met.
Maynard Smith (1974) shows for the mixed equilibrium σ(b) = 1
¯ ve−b/¯ v that   ∞
0 σ(b)π(b,δm)db > π(m,δm) for all pure strategies m ∈ R+, hence π(σ,δm) >
π(m,δm) for all m ∈ R+. Therefore we may conclude for the war of attri-
tion without private information that the mixed equilibrium is evolutionarily
robust.
Corollary 1 The fully mixed equilibrium in the war of attrition with com-
plete information is evolutionarily robust.
4 Propositions
While the equilibrium in the War of Attrition with complete information is
mixed, the War of Attrition with incomplete information has an equilibrium
in pure strategies. The ﬁrst theorem notes that this equilibrium is strict.




1−F(w)dw is an equilibrium
with unique best replies.
Proof : Let φ be the inverse of β, that is φ(β(v)) = v for all v. β is C1
and strictly increasing hence φ exists and is also C1 and strictly increasing.
It is clear that φ′(β(v)) = 1
β′(v) and φ′′(β(v)) = −
β′′(v)
β′(v)3, therefore φ′(β(v)) =
121−F(v)























Theorem 1 implies that β is evolutionarily stable. Note that Bishop et al.
(1978) have used a diﬀerent method to prove that β is an ESS. They ana-
lyzed a ﬁnite partition of the set of valuations V and interpreted their results
for this partition becoming inﬁnitesimal ﬁne. Theorem 1 oﬀers an important
insight: as the ﬁrst condition of ESS, namely π(b,β) > π(˜ b,β) ∀˜ b  = b is
satisﬁed for all b, the second condition does not need to be checked. In what
follows I explore whether there exists a strategy that violates local superior-
ity, the second condition of evolutionary stability.
Consider a strategy γ that is close but distinct to the equilibrium strategy β
in the sense that there are small ǫ1 > ǫ2 > 0 such that ǫ2 < |γ(v)−β(v)| < ǫ1
for all v ∈ V : v > 0. Suppose the population plays γ. Claim 1 shows that β
fares weakly better against γ than γ against itself for any valuation v > 0 if
the distribution of valuations satisﬁes a monotonicity assumption.
Deﬁnition 6 (MHR Barlow, Marshall & Proschan (1963)) F satisﬁes
the monotone hazard rate property if
vf(v)
F(v) is increasing in v for all valuations
in V.
The Exponential-, Binomial-, Poisson-, Normal-, and uniform distributions
all satisfy MHR. Note further that any cdf must satisfy MHR for at least
some valuations v.
Claim 1 If F satisﬁes MHR and if strictly increasing γ(v) is close but dis-






(v + b − γ(w))f(w)dw − b
∂π(b|v,γ)
∂b
       
b=β(v)
=
vf({w : γ(w) = β(v)})
∂β(v)
∂v




vf({w : γ(w) = β(v)})








If γ(v) < β(v), then {w : γ(w) = β(v)} contains valuations that are larger
than v and the derivative is positive. If γ(v) > β(v), the derivative is nega-
tive. ￿
The claim has a weak foundation as the second derivative is not considered.
















as there is no restriction for γ′(v) and hence γ−1′(b) for γ(v) close but distinct
to β(v).
The following theorem seems to test claim 1 given above. Consider a strat-





following theorem proposes a candidate strategy γ such that in a population
of agents playing γ, the strategy β would have a selective disadvantage in
any dynamic that is based on relative payoﬀs.
Theorem 2 If strictly increasing γ : V → R+ with γ(v) > β(v) for all v > 0
solves
γ(v) = β(v) + λv
F ({w : β(v) < γ(w) < γ(v)})
F ({w : β(v) < γ(w)})










f(w)dw − (γ(v) − β(v))F ({w : β(v) < γ(w)})
= v(1 − λ)F ({w : β(v) < γ(w)}) > 0 ∀λ < 1
￿
Note the ostensible strength of the theorem with respect to the interpretation
of the model that is used. As it holds for all valuations,
 
V π(γ(v)|v,γ)f(v)dv >  
V π(β(v)|v,γ)f(v)dv, hence the conclusion also holds ex ante in a two player
game without populations. This would indeed contradict claim 1.
The next theorem reveals the true strength of theorem 2 by stating that
candidate γ must be equal to the equilibrium strategy β.
Theorem 3 If
γ(v) = β(v) + λv
F ({w : β(v) < γ(w) < γ(v)})
F ({w : β(v) < γ(w)})
,
then γ(v) = β(v).





f({w : β(v) = γ(w)})(1 − F(v))
F({w : β(v) < γ(w)})2 < 0 ,
there can be at most one ﬁxed point. Obviously, ξ(β(v)) = β(v). Hence
γ(v) = β(v) and claim 2 is empty. ￿
Let us now consider a strategy γ that intersects the equilibrium strategy
once at valuation ¯ v. It is clear that such a function exists and can be arbi-
trary close to β.3
3For example, γ(v) = β(v)θ for all v < ¯ v and γ(v) = β(v) for all v > ¯ v and ¯ v: β(¯ v) = 1.
15Theorem 4 The equilibrium strategy β is not a neighborhood invader strat-
egy.
Proof : Let γ : V → R+ be continuous, have a positive derivative for all

















  F ({w : γ(w) < β(v)})














































By continuity of π( ) in v, π(γ,γ) > π(β,γ) for all v ∈ (¯ v − ǫ, ¯ v). ￿
Theorem 5 The equilibrium strategy β is not continuously stable.
Proof : Consider a continuously diﬀerentiable and increasing strategy γ
that intersects β at ¯ v and has |γ(v)−β(v)| < ǫ for all v and some positive ǫ.
Then, for all ˜ v smaller than and close to ¯ v:
(γ(˜ v) − β(˜ v))(γ
′(˜ v) − β
′(˜ v)) < 0 .
π(b|˜ v,γ) =
  γ−1(˜ v)
0

















1 − F(˜ v)
γ′(˜ v)
(β
′(˜ v) − γ
′(˜ v))
16Deﬁne ˜ γ+ and ˜ γ− such that γ+(v) = γ−(v) = γ(v) ∀ v  = ˜ v, ˜ γ(˜ v) = γ(˜ v) + δ,
and ˜ γ−(v) = γ(˜ v) − δ.
If γ(˜ v)
(<)
> β(˜ v) we have π(˜ γ+(˜ v)|˜ v,γ)
(<)
> π(γ(˜ v)|˜ v,γ) and π(˜ γ−(˜ v)|˜ v,γ)
(>)
<
π(γ(˜ v)|˜ v,γ), because π(b|v,γ) is continuous in b.
γ is ǫ-close to β, ˜ γ is δ-close to γ for arbitrary small δ and π(˜ γ(˜ v)|˜ v,γ) <
π(γ(˜ v)|˜ v,γ) whenever ˜ γ is closer to β and vice versa. Hence β is not CSS.
￿
Proposition 1 Denote by ˆ v the greatest intersection of γ and β that is
smaller than ¯ v. There is a ˜ v ∈ (ˆ v, ¯ v) such that π(γ(v)|v,γ) > π(β(v)|v,γ) ∀ v ∈
(˜ v, ¯ v).
Proof : By theorem 4 π(β(v)|v,γ) > π(γ(v)|v,γ) for all v close to and
greater than ˆ v. By continuity of π there must be an intermediate value ˜ v < ¯ v
such that π(γ(˜ v)|˜ v,γ) = π(β(˜ v)|˜ v,γ). As ˆ v is the greatest intersection of β
and γ that is smaller than ¯ v, ˜ v is the unique intersection of π(γ(v)|v,γ) and
π(β(v)|v,γ) between ˆ v and ¯ v. ￿
As a consequence, we can ﬁnd for any positive ǫ a strategy γ that is close
to β in the sense of the Prohorov metric, d(δγ,δβ) < ǫ such that ˜ v < ¯ v and
π(γ(v)|v,γ) > π(β(v)|v,γ) for all valuations v ∈ (˜ v, ¯ v).
5 Numeric Calculations
Consider a uniform distribution on [0,1] and
γ(v) =
 
β(v)θ if v < ¯ v
β(v) if v ≥ ¯ v
.
With this parametrization there are two intersections of β and γ where the
smaller intersection is at ˆ v = 0. The ﬁgures (3) - (4) below depict the
strategies and payoﬀs for θ = 10 and θ = 1.1: Numeric calculations reveal
that for θ → 1 the value ˜ v where π(β(v)|v,γ) hits π(γ(v)|v,γ) from below
approaches ¯ v.
17Figure 3: bids and payoﬀs for θ = 10.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I analyze the dynamic stability of equilibria in second price
allpay auctions with continuous bids and incomplete information on the val-
uation of the opponent. This is of particular interest as Bishop, Cannings
& Maynard Smith (1978) show the existence of a unique ESS but Bishop &
Cannings (1978) show convergence only for ﬁnite strategies. This paper aims
at explaining the gap. In games with ﬁnite strategy sets an ESS cannot be
invaded by neither independent and undirected deviations nor correlated and
close deviations. Bishop, Cannings & Maynard Smith (1978) test their ESS
only against independent deviations. I show that there exists a correlated
mass deviation strategy that violates local superiority for an open set of val-
uations. The share of these valuations is constant and does not depend on
the level of uncertainty. I give a plausible interpretation of mass deviations
which is valid for all Bayesian games. I show that the equilibrium strategy
does not satisfy continuous stability.
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